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ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY
UNDER RULE 23-ABUSES AND REFORMS
The increased use of the class action device for the prosecution of
multiple claims has brought with it special ethical problems for
the attorneys involved. This comment will examine the ethical
problems which have arisen as a result of the maintenance of class
actions under Federal Rule 23,1 and will discuss the effect of a
breach of ethics by the attorney on the members of the class. The
specific problems to be considered are those of claim solicitation,
attorney's fees, problems involved in the dismissal or compromise
of class actions, and some of the ethical questions involved in ade-
quate representation of the class.
CLAVz SOLIcITATION
The problem of claim solicitation has long been a topic in any dis-
cussion of professional ethics and responsibility.2 The Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility points out that claim solicitation is a dis-
reputable practice and was an indictable offense at common law.8
In Buford v. American Finance Co.,4 the court stated that ". . . the
plain truth is that in many cases Rule 23(b) (3) is being used as a
device for the solicitation of litigation. This is clearly an 'undesir-
able result' which cannot be tolerated." 5 Claim solicitation prob-
lems arise in the period prior to the filing of the action and under
the provision requiring notice to the unnamed members of the
class.
The problem of claim solicitation can arise prior to filing the ac-
tion as a class action under Rule 23. This situation was discussed
in Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart. Inc.6 Plaintiffs in this ac-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
2. Korn v. Franchard Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92845 (D.C.N.Y.
1970).
3. ABA CODE OF PRorEssIoNAL REsPoNsIILn'T, Cannons 2,28, Ethical
Consideration 2-3.
4..333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
5. Id. at 1251.
6. 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972). [Hereinafter referred to as Halverson.]
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tion were a group of franchisees of the defendant, Convenient Food
Mart. Prior to the filing of the anti-trust suit, an association was
formed and a lawyer was hired to negotiate for advertising "re-
bates. The attorney was invited to a meeting where he discussed
the possibility of bringing an anti-trust suit against the franchisor.
The association voted in favor of the suit and, the following day
the attorney and the president of the association discussed sending
a letter to the other store owners requesting them to join in the
suit. The letter, which stated that there would be no fee if the
suit were not a success, was accompanied by an authorization
form to be completed and returned by the franchisee. In determin-
ing whether these actions were misconduct, the court concluded
that even though the lawyer committed a slight breach of ethics,
his misconduct was of small importance in comparison to the rights
of his clients.
7
The Halverson case presents a situation in which the attorney
has knowledge of a situation which could be a potential class ac-
tion. One commentator, however, suggested that:
Any suggestions to the effect that class action litigation provides
plaintiffs' counsel with a means of engaging in client solicitation
is simply not meaningful. In fact, he may be restricted in a number
of ways from furthering the Rule's objectives because of certain
strictures which govern his conduct in other kinds of practice. For
example, could plaintiff's counsel, in an effort to firm up the class
prior to any class determination, properly suggest to the class rep-
resentatives that they attempt informally to solicit others interested
in the litigation? Probably not. But to accomplish the basic pur-
poses of the rule should he not be allowed to do this? 8
In one case, which was not a class action, the court suggested that
restricting communications among association members would be
contrary to the First Amendment. 9 To reach these conclusions the
authors must have assumed that there is no substantial danger of
claim solicitation in the use of the class action device. It was fur-
ther asserted that a lawyer should be able to suggest to the class
representatives that they solicit others who might have a potential
claim. These assertions will be dealt with in order.
First, it is necessary to examine the presupposition that there is
7. Id. at 931.
8. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 501, 514 n. 64 (1969).
9. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
no problem with claim solicitation in class actions. Although there
have been assertions to the contrary, there is at least one recent
case which was dismissed partially because of the attorney's con-
duct prior to the filing of the action.10 In this case the attorney
sought proxy votes from a group of stockholders, in order to at-
tend a stockholders meeting. After attending the meeting the at-
torney conferred with another attorney and disclosed to him that
he had discussed with others the possibility of filing an action
against the defendant corporation. He told the shareholders, from
whom he had obtained the proxies, that he was filing the action
and if they "wanted to be represented, the suit could be filed in
the form of a class action."" In addition to representing the stock-
holders, the attorney sought to file an action on behalf of the class
of bondholders. He testified in his deposition that he had con-
tacted a friend, who was a bondholder, in regard to participating
in the suit as a representative. The court in this action held that
the attorney's "activity constitutes an abuse of the class action,
which courts should not permit."'1 2 In regard to this supposition
it should be noted that the Manual for Complex and Multi-District
Litigation states that "[a] mong the potential abuses of the class ac-
tion processes are the following: (1) solicitation of direct legal rep-
resentation of potential and actual class members who are not
formal parties to the class action.. ... 13
It has been asserted that the lawyer should be able to suggest to
the class representatives that they attempt to solicit others for the
litigation and that this would comport with the objectives of Rule
23. The intention of the Advisory Committee was to create a pro-
cedural device
... which would achieve economies of time, effort and expense,
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other un-
desirable results.14
It is suggested that pre-filing solicitation is an "undesirable re-
sult" 5 and that this possibility for abuse should be eliminated so
as to achieve the full objectives of the Advisory Committee.
The problem of claim solicitation is not restricted to the time be-
10. Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
11. Id. at 239.
12. Id. at 240.
13. § 1.41 (1973).
14. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee Note, 39
F.R.D. 69, 102-103 (1966).
15. Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
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fore the class action is filed, but has also manifested itself in regard
to the notice required by Rule 23(c) (2).16 It has been said that
"... . the giving of notice pursuant to Rule 23 (c) may always argu-
ably create a problem of solicitation by the very nature of the
Rule, nevertheless such should be avoided whenever and to the ex-
tent possible."'1 The difficulty is to determine the distinction be-
tween notice and claim solicitation. The complexity of multi-party
litigation makes this task even more difficult. Before proceeding,
it should be made clear that in a Rule 23(b) (3) class action there
are two types of notice, that which is prepared by the court, and
that which is prepared and sent by the attorney.'8 In School Dis-
trict of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,19 the court
found that notice which was prepared by the attorney would ser-
iously impair the court's "appearance of detached impartiality."20
They went on to note that further complexities were involved when
inquiries were directed to the court regarding the notice. To an-
swer the inquiry would place the court in the position of being in
correspondence with prospective litigants; to ignore the inquiry
would "cast doubt and suspicion upon the judicial process.
'21
There are several cases where the use of unapproved notice has
been challenged. In Korn v. Franchard Corp.22 the court ordered
a proof of claim to be mailed to the members of the proposed class.
The court's purpose was to ascertain the size of the class and deter-
mine how many members had bought security interests, relying on
the prospectus which was being challenged as misleading. The
16. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23 (c) (2). The full text reads:
In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified with reasonable effort. The notice shall ad-
vise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the
class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not re-
quest exclusion; (C) any member who does not request exclusion,
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
17. State of Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 576-77 (D.C.
Minn. 1968).
18. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 327
(1973).
19. 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Penn. 1967). [Hereinafter referred to as
School District v. Harper & Row.]
20. Id. at 1005.
21. Id.
22. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 92845 (D.C.N.Y. 1970).
court furnished the names and addresses of the proposed class mem-
bers to plaintiffs' counsel who were to send the notice. The attor-
ney utilized these names and addresses to mail a letter under the
name of "Protective Committee, 63 Wall Associates." 23  The letter,
which solicited investors involved in another action filed by the
same attorney, contained two phone numbers. One of the numbers
was to the attorney's office, the other to a firm employed by him.
The court held that these actions revealed "a lack of any respect
for basic principles of professional ethics and responsibility." 24 In
Taub v. Glickman,25 a similar case involving the same attorneys,
the court stated:
Although I do not pass nor comment upon whether or not the con-
duct of counsel was ethically impermissible, I do note my disap-
proval of counsels' unauthorized attempt to indirectly communicate
with parties concerning a matter that was then sub-judice before
me.
2 6
The problem of sending communications other than the prescribed
notice to members of the class arose in Kronenberg v. Hotel Gov-
ernor Clinton, Inc..27 In that case the attorneys sent a misleading
communication along with the notice, and the court held that this
activity was improper.
2 8
Each suggestion relative to curbing the problem of claim solicita-
tion and unapproved notice has been the subject of attack and con-
troversy. Kaplan stated that ". . . it should be recognized that
court-controlled notice is an alternative to private activities that
can be quiet impalatable. ' 29 In School District v. Harper & Row,
the court attacked this alternative saying:
We are loath to impose upon the already overburdened clerical fa-
cilities of this Court the onerous task of preparing and forwarding
to all the proposed members of the class the notices required by
new Rule 23(c) (2), and the ensuing detail of the consequent rec-
ord-keeping.30
Although hiring more clerks might help solve the problem, there
are more effective ways of doing so.
The Manual for Complex and Multi-District Litigation has sug-
23. Id. at 90,168.
24. Id. at 90,169.
25. 14 F.R. Serv. 2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
26. Id. at 849.
27. 281 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). [Hereinafter referred to as Kron-
enberg.]
28. Id. at 625.
29. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARv. L. Rzv. 356, 398-99 (1967).
30. 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-1005 (E.D. Penn. 1967).
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gested that a local rule be adopted forbidding direct or indirect
written or oral communication by existing parties or counsel with
potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to
the action, unless the communication has prior court approval.31
The Manual does, however, recognize the need for some communi-
cation with class members for routine factual inquiries and among
class members to dispel misunderstanding on various phases of the
suit.32 This solution could eliminate some of the problems but it
does not deal with the pre-filing claim solicitation difficulties. The
rule could be extended to cover this situation, counsel being per-
mitted to ask questions of class members to determine if any pre-
filing claim solicitation was present. By utilizing the recommen-
dations of the Manual and extending them, it is submitted that
many of the problems discussed previously could be overcome.
Rodman Ward, Jr. and Wayne N. Elliott have suggested a pro-
cedural approach to utilize the courts to notify the members of
the class, but which would not overburden them.33 These authors
noted that the position taken by the court in School District v.
Harper & Row has been criticized, and that the preparation of no-
tice need not be done by the court.3 4 They recommend the ap-
proach taken in Brennan v. Midwestern Life Insurance Co.35 which
directed that the notice be prepared by the plaintiff's counsel and
submitted to the court for approval.
The last question to be resolved is whom to task with sending
out the notice. Ward and Elliott seem to feel that a cautionary
paragraph would be sufficient to eliminate the possibility of abuse
occurring when the attorney sends out the notice.36 In looking at
the problems in Kronenberg and Korn, however, it is apparent that
they developed after the court relinquished final control over the
notice. It is submitted that the most viable alternative would be
for the court to have final contact with the notice prior to distribu-
tion, for it is unlikely that a layman would recognize an abuse even
31. § 1.41 (1973).
32. Id.
33. Ward and Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice in
the Class Action-A Symposium 1969, 10 B.C. IND. & Cow. L. REV. 557
(1968-69).
34. Id. at 562.
35. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
36. See Ward and Elliott, supra note 31, at 564.
if warned against it. With this requirement of court supervision,
the notice problems associated with claim solicitation could be elim-
inated.
Within the class action device there is a potentiality for abuse in
the area of claim solicitation, both prior to the filing of the action
and post filing of the action by way of unapproved communica-
tions. There is also the problem of solicitation in giving notice
pursuant to Rule 23(c). It is suggested that by adopting the re-
forms discussed in this section, the problems related to claim soli-
citation could be deterred.
ATromEYs' FEES
Of the ethical problems involved in a class action, the question
of attorneys' fees has been one of the most troublesome. One court
commented that:
[s]ubstantial questions have been raised whether the Rule, in-
tended to benefit the small consumer or investor who would other-
wise have no means of redress, has really achieved its promise, or
rather whether it has resulted in miniscule recoveries by its in-
tended beneficiaries while lawyers have reaped a golden harvest of
fees.37
In any discussion of attorney's fees it is important to understand
the relationship that exists between the attorney and the named
and unnamed parties. It has been held that counsel is in a fidu-
ciary relationship with both the named representative parties and
the unnamed parties,38 which means that the attorney owes the
same degree of care to both the named and unnamed parties.
The major issue in the consideration of fees is the determination
of when a fee becomes excessive. The American Bar Association
suggests that a fee is clearly excessive when a prudent and reason-
able lawyer reviewing the situation would be left with a firm be-
lief that the fee was unreasonable.3 9 The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility specifies several guidelines for determining when a fee
is excessive. The first consideration discussed is ". . . the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.14 0 Second
is the likelihood that the attorney would have to preclude other em-
ployment to continue with the action. Another is customary fees
37. Free World Foreign Cars v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
38. Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass.
1963).
39. ABA CoDE OF PtoFEssIoNA REsPONr 15iTY, Disciplinary Rule 2-106,
40. Id.
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in the locale. Still other related factors are the amount of money
involved in the outcome of the litigation, and any time limits that
might have been imposed on the attorney. A sixth consideration
concerns the "nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client." 41 Seventh is the experience, reputation and abil-
ity of the attorney, and last is whether the fee is fixed or conting-
ent. Whereas, these have been the traditional factors used in evalu-
ating the fairness of a fee, it has been noted that:
As the form, nature and substance of the relationship between the
class members and class counsel are different from those which
characterize the relationship between counsel and an individual
party capable of contracting for the payment of attorney's fees, so
also is the standard measuring the attorney's fees different.
42
In dealing with the situation there are two areas which have pro-
duced the greatest numbers of ethical problems. The first is the
contingent fee contract; the second is the solicitation of fees from
class members and potential class members.
The contingent fee contract has presented special problems when
used in class actions and has caused the greatest controversy. The
two most prominent areas of concern are: (1) Whether the contract
itself is being abused; and (2) Whether the provisions of the con-
tract extend to those members of the class who did not sign it, but
who have benefitted as a result of the suit. As has been discussed,
one of the criteria for determining attorney's fees has been whether
the attorney was paid a fixed fee or whether the fee was contingent
on the successful prosecution of the action. The traditional view,
that an attorney working on a contingent fee is entitled to greater
compensation, has led to what one judge has called the "contingent
fee syndrome," where courts will enforce the contract without de-
termining its fairness.43 The class action has been compared to the
Italian proverb: "A lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's
garden."44 It has led others, such as Justice Lombard in his dissent
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaqueline, to remark that "[o] bviously the
only persons to gain from a class suit are not potential plaintiffs,
but the attorneys who will represent them.
' 45
41. Id.
42. Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (D.C. 1973).
43. State of fllinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 223-
24 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
44. Id. at 224.
45. 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968).
The criticism launched at the class action device has led some
recent courts to reappraise the agreements between counsel and
the parties. In Kiser v. Miller,46 a contingent fee contract was held
unenforceable. A brief look at the facts that led to this decision
reveals that the original class of plaintiffs sought pension benefits
that had been denied to them by their employer and that two ad-
ditional groups of plaintiffs intervened in the action. All three at-
torneys involved had contingent fee contracts with the members of
their respective groups, the provisions varying with each group.
The court's target of attack was the contingent fee agreement be-
tween the plaintiff class and counsel in the original action. One of
the problems with these agreements was that they were sent out
after the judgment had been entered.47 The court acknowledged
that the contingent fee agreement had served a useful purpose in
other types of actions but remarked that it was inappropriate in
the class action.48 The court adopted the view expressed in Illinois
v. Harper & Row Publishers, that Rule 23 must be preserved and
that a solution must be found for this problem.
40
The Illinois v. Harper & Row 50 case focused on another important
issue in the contingent fee area, that is, determining if the conting-
ent fee contracts can be extended to those members of the class who
did not sign it. The facts indicate that the plaintiffs brought a
civil anti-trust action alleging that the defendants had conspired
to eliminate discounts on sales of library books to schools and li-
braries. As the date for trial approached, and after considerable
discovery had been completed, all of the defendants settled except
one. The final settlement was not reached until after the trial had
started. The attorneys requested 20% of the recovery, pursuant to
a contingent fee arrangement entered into with some of the mem-
bers of the class. Notification was sent specifying the fee requested
and no objections were filed. Thus, the question was whether to
extend the terms of the contingent fee contract to those members
of the class who were not parties to the agreement. Although this
case involves a post-settlement situation, the issue is the same in
post-litigation circumstances. The attorneys argued that these ar-
rangements should be considered an important factor in assessing
the fees, even as to the absent class members. 51 The court recogni-
zed, however, that:
46. 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.C. 1973).
47. Id. at 1314.
48. Id. at 1315.
49. Id.
50. 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. IMI. 1972).
51. Id. at 223.
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[T]his procedure [has] been followed in the settlement of a num-
ber of class action cases in which the contingent percentage fee ar-
rangements have been automatically extended to class members.
While the assessment of a flat percentage fee to cover all plaintiffs
may relieve the court from the burden of making its own evaluation
of the reasonable value of the services rendered, I do not believe
that it is fair to the class members who were unrepresented when
the fee contracts were made.52
The use of the contingent fee contract in class actions, although it
appears to be a pervasive problem, has not been subjected to criti-
cism until only recently.
Prior to discussing proposed reforms, it should be emphasized
that part of the problem has been the courts' attitude toward fees
in a class action. Whereas the Ameri~an Bar Association has ex-
pressed the view that excessive fees must not be charged,53 some
courts have stated that, "[s] ubstantial counsel fees may even be an
acceptable incentive to encourage forceful prosecution of cases im-
bued with public interest."5 4
A third potential abuse in the fee area is fee solicitation. As
stated by the Manual for Complex Litigation:
In the absence of some preventative action by the court, formal
parties to the action or counsel for the formal parties may directly
or indirectly, without knowledge or consent of the court, solicit
from the potential or actual members of the class (or subclasses)
who are not formal parties, funds for attorneys' fees and expenses,
or agreements to pay fees and expenses. To the party solicited,
solicitation may appear to be an authorized activity approved by
the court, simply by reference to the title of the court, the style of
the action, the name of the judge and to official processes. Such
unapproved solicitation may be of doubtful ethical propriety and
may well result in well founded dissatisfaction with judicial man-
agement of the action. 55
Although there is no evidence of the pervasiveness of such "unap-
proved solicitation," it should be considered as a possible source of
unethical conduct. The Manual suggests that by adopting the pro-
visions to abolish claim solicitation this problem can be overcome.56
52. Id.
53. Canon 2, Ethical Consideration 2-17.
54. Halverson, 458 F.2d at 931 n.5. See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) which stated, "The prospect of handsome
compensation is held out as an inducement to encourage lawyers to bring
such suits."
55. § 1.41 (1973).
56. Id.
The area of excessive fees and the problem of the contingent fee
contract demand a solution. It should be emphasized that the at-
torney who represents a class is entitled to a reasonable fee for his
services. The purpose of any reform is to keep fees reasonable and
to minimize abuse. Only in this way can the class action device
benefit the persons most in need of it, that is, those who would not
be able to adequately assert their rights on an individual basis. The
Manual and recent cases suggest that the determination should be
left to the court.57 The court would be required to look to certain
criteria to determine what reasonable fees would be for the ser-
vices rendered. The court in Kiser v. Miller suggested a two level
approach. On the first level the court should consider such factors
as the time and effort involved, the complexity and uniqueness of
the issues, the amount of legal skill necessary to handle the issues
involved, the use made of other counsels' work, the risks involved
and the results of the action. The court suggests that on another
level it should consider three additional factors, owing to the
uniqueness of the class action. These are the "Attorney-Client Re-
lationship," the "Public Service Element," and the "Incentive Fac-
tor.""8 The first two were explained by one court which said:
One accepting employment as counsel in a class action does not be-
come a class representative through simple operation of the free en-
terprise system. Rather, both the class determination and designa-
tion of counsel as class representative come through judicial deter-
minations, and the attorney so benefitted serves in something of a
position of public trust. Consequently, he shares with the court the
burden of protecting the class action device against public appre-
hensions that it encourages ... excessive attorney's fees.59
In assessing the fees the court must balance these factors with the
incentive factor discussed earlier. It is only in this way that the
injured parties can receive adequate representation, and insure that
the attorney receives adequate compensation for his services.
D3smzms Am ComPRoMisE
The area in dismissal and compromise which has caused the great-
est confusion is the question of when an attorney may drop the
class allegations in a complaint in order to secure a settlement for
his client. The adoption of Rule 23 (e) has solved many of the
complexities previously associated with dismissal and compromise.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 23 (e) in 1966, notification was not
57. Id.; Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (D.C. 1973); Illinois v.
Harper & Row, 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. IM. 1972).
58. Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. at 1315.
59. Alpine Pharmacy Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co. Inc., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050
(2d Cir. 1973).
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required in the "hybrid"or "spurious" action unless directed by the
court. All class actions under the revised rule require notice of a
dismissal or compromise. 60 Rule 23(e) was adopted to protect the
rights of those who are represented but who are unnamed parties
in the action.61 The current difficulty with dismissal is the de-
termination of the point at which a complaint can be striken to
exclude any references to the class action, thereby circumventing
the notification required by Rule 23 (e). If the rule applies, it must
then be decided what type of notification will satisfy its require-
ments. The attorney owes an equal obligation to those parties who
are before the court, as well as those not before the court.62 This
concept was elaborated on by the court in GreenfieZd v. Villager
Industries, Inc.,63 which said that:
Not the least important of the fiduciary duties shared by counsel
and the court is their duty to insure that absentee class members
have knowledge of proceedings in which a final judgment may af-
fect their interests.64
In Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corporation,65 a class action was filed
on behalf of the shareholders of Detroit Steel. The attorney stated
that a motion for class determination would be made after discovery
was completed. Plaintiffs' counsel, in defiance of the court's orders,
made a motion to a different court to strike the class action alle-
gations. The motion was granted, a settlement was then reached,
and plaintiffs sought to dismiss the action. The question was
whether Rule 23(e) applied in spite of the fact that the class had
not yet been determined. The court held that for purposes of dis-
missal or compromise a suit filed as a class action is to be treated
as such "until there is a full determination that the class action is
not proper."60 The court based its finding on two grounds: (1)
Because of the publicity the suit had received, some of the class
members may have relied on the suit to redress their claims there-
60. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42 F.R.D.
324, 328 (E.D. Penn. 1967). [Hereinafter referred to as Philadelphia v.
Anaconda.]
61. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970).
62. Greenfield v. Villager Industries Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
[Hereinafter cited as Greenfield.]
63. Id.
64. Id. at 832.
65. 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
66. Id. at 483.
fore not filing their own separate actions; and (2) In reliance on
the statement in Philadelphia Electric v. Anaconda0 7 that "[N]o
litigant should be permitted to enhance his own bargaining power
by merely alleging that he is acting for a class of litigants."0 8 The
court reasoned that if amendment were allowed in order to strike
the class action allegations, the defendants might be willing to pay
the named parties to eliminate the class. In this way the plain-
tiffs would have more bargaining power by virtue of filing their
suit as a class action.
A contrary view was espoused by the court in Elias v. National
Car Rental System.69 In that case the plaintiff brought a class
action based on a violation of Federal Securities Law. Prior to
class determination, the representative party wrote to his attorney
that he no longer wanted to prosecute the action. A dismissal was
requested, and it was argued that the provisions of Rule 23(e)
should be invoked. In dismissing the action without notification
the court said:
[T~he court does not perceive it has any duty to notify those whom
plaintiff's counsel might claim to be class members of the proposed
dismissal. Rule 23 does not require notice under these circum-
stances and to do so is in a sense merely soliciting a client for plain-
tiff's counsel under the aegis of the court. This would be im-
proper.TO
The court remarked that it was convinced that plaintiff had not
been "bought off," and that no one was relying on the action.71
In Berse v. Berman72 the court came to the same conclusion but
advanced a different theory, holding that if the action were dis-
missed, each member would still be able to enforce his rights in-
dependently. The court noted that the situation would be differ-
ent if class members had learned of the suit and were relying on it
to prosecute their claims.73 When there has been notification to
the members of the class it would be difficult to ascertain whether
injured parties were relying on the action, absent some notification
to them of the dismissal.7 4
Therefore, there are two policies served by requiring notice.
First, notice reduces the possibility that the named representatives
will have increased bargaining power by filing the suit as a class
67. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Penn. 1967).
68. Id. at 328.
-69. 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 4th Div. 1973).
70. Id. at 277.
71. Id.
72. 60 F.R.D. 414 (D. Minn. 4th Div. 1973).
73. Id. at 416.
74. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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action. Second, it serves to inform those who have relied on the
action to prosecute their claims.
7 5
A secondary problem is to determine what notice will be suffi-
cient to satisfy Rule 23 (e). In Greenfield v. Villager Industries,
Inc.7 6 the court was called upon to determine the sufficiency bf
notification accomplished by publication in the Wall Street Journal
on two nights during the Easter Holiday season. The plaintiffs'
attorneys had easy access to the names and addresses of the mem-
bers of the class. The court held that the responsibility for meet-
ing the requirement was primarily on the attorney seeking the dis-
missal.7 7 The court said that notice by publication under these
circumstances was "superficial" and would not withstand the Mul-
lane test, that is, it was not ". . . reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their ob-
jections.17 8 In order to satisfy due process, the notice must also
"afford a reasonable time for those interested to appear or default,
acquiesce or contest." 79 The notice must also contain information
on fees and expenses, the estimated unitary recovery, and must
specify the time and place of the settlement hearing.
8 0
It is thus submitted that the notice requirement of Rule 23 (e) be
strictly adhered to unless the court can determine with absolute
certainty that dismissal without notice would leave no possibility
for prejudice.8 ' It should be required that individual notice be
given whenever feasible82 in order to protect the unrepresented
parties against an attempted compromise or settlement.
ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
Federal Rule 23 (a) (4) provides that ". . . the representative par-
75. Muntz v. Ohio Screw Products, 61 F.R.D. 396, 398 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
76. 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
77. Id. at 832.
78. Id. quoting Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
79. Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. at 314.
80. Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.46.
81. 7A WRCHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil § 1797.
82. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.45; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940), where the court says that due process, "... does not indicate the
giving of notice where it is not feasible to do so."
ties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."83
In defining this requirement it has been held that adequate repre-
sentation demands that there be no conflicts of interest between
the attorney and the class, and that the attorney "prosecute the
action vigorously."8 4 The discretionary question of adequate rep-
resentation by the parties' attorney has led to inquiries regarding
the ethical propriety of certain practices. The primary issue is
whether an attorney can ethically, "adequately represent" the
class, and also be a party to the action.
A recent development in class actions has been a situation in
which the attorney is an injured party seeking to be both counsel
for the class, as well as a member of the class. In Graybeal v.
-American Savings and Loan Association 5 the court held that the
attorneys could not fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class where they sought to be both "attorneys for, and repre-
sentatives of the proposed class."8 6 The court remarked that such
"dual roles are inherently fraught with conflicts of interests."8 The
reasoning was that a class action is particularly susceptible to the
attorneys' recommending a settlement on unfavorable terms due to
the large fees involved. The court argued that in a situation where
individual recoveries are likely to be small, but the overall recov-
ery will probably be large, the ". . . plaintiffs may stand to gain
little as class representatives, but may gain very much as attorneys
for the class.
88
In Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc.8 0 the court came to the
same conclusion but offered a different analysis. In that case a
class of plaintiffs sought to recover damages based on alleged vio-
lations of the Truth in Lending Act. The plaintiff was an associate
in the firm that was representing his class in the action. The court
held that there was inadequate representation, because of the sub-
stantial ethical problem which would arise if the plaintiff were
called as a witness.90  The Code of Professional Responsibility pro-
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4).
84. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
85. 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.C. 1973).
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id. at 14. This analysis has received recent support in Erovaldi v.
First National Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The
court added:
Since the named plaintiff is also acting as co-counsel for the class
his interest in legal fees clearly outweighs his interest as a plaintiff
and creates a conflict of interest. He cannot therefore be consid-
ered a fair and adequate representative of the class.
88. Id.
89. 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972). [Hereinafter cited as Kriger.)
90. Id. at 105.
[VOL. 12: 224, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
vides support for this position.91 If the lawyer is both counsel and
witness, he would be more easily impeached as having an interest
in the outcome of the case. The attorney, challenged as a witness,
is disadvantaged and in an untenable position to argue his own
credibility. Further, "[t]he roles of an advocate and of a witness
are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue
the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts ob-
jectively.902 In Kriger, the attorney recognized the problem and
argued that he could effectively pursue the litigation without his
own testimony or, if his testimony were required, his associates
could and would withdraw as counsel. The court responded to this
argument by saying that there was no adequate representation
where the attorney would be under -a disability not likely to be
found in any other member of the class.93
The most vigorous attack on this dual position is found in two
cases which involved the same attorney.94 In similar actions at-
torney Shields sought to be both counsel and representative party
in a suit alleging that the defendant failed to make disclosures as
required by the Truth in Lending Act. The court in Shields v.
First National Bank of Arizona 95 agreed with the decision of Judge
Frey, who stated in Shields v. Valley National Bank of Arizona:9 6
The court further feels that Shields has not demonstrated compe-
tence to represent the class because he seeks to be not only the at-
torney for the class and be awarded a fee for his representation,
he seeks in the same action personal relief. The practice involved
does not seem to the court to comport with the high quality of ob-
jectivity, duty and integrity required of lawyers practicing in this
court or elsewhere. This case seems to involve a questionable
method of soliciting legal business and such solicitation should not
be encouraged.97
The court in both actions clearly held that seeking to be both at-
torney and representative party would preclude adequate repre-
91. ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 5-9.
92. Id.
93. Kriger, 56 F.R.D. at 105-06.
94. Shields v. First National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz.
1972); Shields v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz.
1971).
95. 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972).
96. 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971).
97. Id. at 450.
sentation, further suggesting that this situation encourages a form
of claim solicitation.
Although there is some authority to the contrary,98 the courts
have generally disallowed the practice of the attorney acting as
both a representative party and as attorney for the class. It seems
clear that if the practice were allowed, it would surely lead to ser-
ious ethical objections.
CHALLENGING A BREACH OF ETHICS
The purpose of this section is to determine the strategic ramifi-
cations of challenging what counsel believes to be a breach of
ethics, and discuss the effect this challenge has had in cases where
the propriety of counsels' conduct has been questioned.
The first, and most important area, is the strategic implication
of a challenge to opposing counsel. The first step is to determine
who has the burden of -proving that the conduct in question is a
breach of ethics. In Dolgow v. Anderson 9 the court stated that
"[u] ntil the contrary is demonstrated, courts will assume that mem-
bers of the bar are skilled in their profession."'100 As one law re-
view commentator remarked:
It would appear that an attack upon a party's lawyer, under 23 (a)
(4) . . . is strategically disastrous unless the incompetence charged
is specific, supported by solid evidence, and so apparent as to be
obvious. Even where incompetence seems patent, this contention
will inevitably involve the speculatory difficulties of definition and
proof of professional inability. Therefore, it is wise to assume that
a judge might not agree with an allegation of incompetence about
a fellow attorney.11
If this is an accepted strategy, it would appear that questionable
conduct could be going unchallenged, and if this is true, the ethical
problems in class actions could well be more pervasive than prev-
iously believed. Further, if the unchallenged conduct is in fact
more pervasive, some steps must be taken to assure that the class
action device does not fall into disrepute.
The general view regarding a breach of ethics was advanced in
Stravrides v. Mellon National Bank and Trust Co..102 In a deposi-
tion one of the plaintiffs was asked about the circumstances sur-
rounding the initiation of the suit, and how the action was being
98. See Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
99. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
100. Id. at 496.
101. Donelan, Requisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, The Class
Action a Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rnv. 527, 536 (1969).
102. 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Penn. 1973).
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financed. The attorney instructed the plaintiff being questioned
that the inquiries were to go unanswered. The issue the court was
ultimately to decide was the effect a determination of unethical
conduct would have on the action.. The court held that it was per-
missable to consider the ethical conduct of the attorney in deter-
mining whether to certify a class. The court felt that they were
the "guardian of the rights of the absentees, 108 and that it was
their duty to see that the absentees were represented -by counsel
who were intellectually and ethically competent.10 4 In this case
the questions were designed primarily to discover if there was claim
solicitation involved. The court held that insofar as this was the
purpose of the questions, they were to be answered. 10 5
Several courts prior to Stravrides had drawn similar conclusions.
In Korn v. Franchard,0 6 where counsel used names and addresses
provided for a court approved communication, to send an unap-
proved one, the court held that this action prohibited counsel from
fairly and adequately representing the members of the purported
class. 07 The court then decided that the action could not be certi-
fied as a class suit, though recognizing the difficulty inherent in
this position concerning the rights of the unnamed members of the
class, who were relying on the suit to prosecute their individual
claims. The court solved this problem by ordering the defendants
to mail notice to all of those who had been sent a notice and proof
of claim. The notice was to inform investors of the class action
determination and advise them that they could intervene as indi-
vidual plaintiffs, provided notice of their intentions were properly
filed. In Taub v. Glickman'0 8 the court did not state what pro-
cedures were to be followed subsequent to their dismissal of the
action. Neither did the court find that there was a breach of eth-
ics, but rather that there was inadequate representation to main-
tain the action as a class action. 0 9 The court in Simon v. Merrill
Lynch 10 came to a similar conclusion where there was evidence
103. Id. at 637.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 92845 (D.C.N.Y. 1970).
107. Id. at 90,167.
108. 14 F.R. Serv. 2d 847, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
109. Id.
110. 16 F.R. Serv. 2d 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
that the action was "the result of an effort to seek out a person
willing to have a class action instituted in his name as representa-
tive of a class.""'
Dismissing the action and taking steps to assure that there is no
reliance on the suit is a relatively new position and there is conflict
between the cases on the point. In Dolgow v. Anderson, the chal-
lenge resulted in an enthusiastic report regarding counsel's abili-
ties.112  In Kronenberg the attorneys sent an unauthorized letter
with the notice. The court refused to dismiss the action, stating
that they are primarily concerned with the interests of the class
members. A dismissal, in the court's opinion, would be adverse to
the class members' interests because of their reliance on the action
while the statute of limitations had run on their individual
claims."1 3  The court in Halverson advanced a similar analysis,
noting that the attorneys' slight breach of ethics "should not prej-
udice the rights of his clients." 14
In the area of fees, if the court finds that the contingent fee con-
tracts were exhorbitant, they may disallow them and impose a rea-
sonable attorneys' fee." 5 This is rare, however, and the usual re-
sult is that the fee contract is not only upheld but is extended to
those members of the class who did not sign it. 1 6 The results in
Kiser and Illinois v. Harper & Row are clearly better in that they
assure the attorney receives reasonable compensation and the class
receives adequate representation.
In the area of settlements, the effect of a violation of Rule 23(e)
is to require notification prior to court approval of a settlement.117
An interesting development occurred in Greenfield v. Villager In-
dustries,"8 where the argument was advanced that any objection
to the settlement was moot because the district court had previously
approved it, and its terms had already been carried out. The court
rejected the argument as "frivolous," asserting that the terms of
the settlement provided that it was not to be carried out pending
final appeal. The court ordered that all proceedings pertaining
to the settlement were void and all settlement orders were to be
vacated."19
111. Id. at 1022.
112. 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
113. 281 F. Supp. 622, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
114. 458 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 1972).
115. Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.C. 1973).
116. Illinois v. Harper & Row, 55 F.R.D. 221, 223 (N.D. fI. 1972).
117. Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. IM. 1970);
Muntz v. Ohio Screw Products, 61 F.R.D. 396, 399 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
118. 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
119. Id.
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The general trend seems to be either to dismiss the action or to
disallow it as a class action. It should be recognized that it is the
class that requires the courts' protection and that if a dismissal is
entered, the court should take steps to insure that the class is pro-
tected, as was done in Korn v. Franchard.
120
CONCLUSION
The ethical problems that have developed as a result of increased
use of the class action do not in any way eliminate its potential to
afford a recovery for those who would not be able to prosecute their
claims individually. It is in the spirit of preserving Rule 23 that
this article was written. The problems discussed are ones that are
frequently cited in a discussion of the class action device. It is im-
portant to eliminate these problems by taking reformatory action
before Rule 23 falls into disrepute, and can no longer be utilized
by those to whom it was originally intended to benefit.
BRIAN G. Rix
120. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 92845 (D.C.N.Y. 1970).

